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JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A-1 Disposal agrees that the issue is whether or not the Court erred 
when it ruled that there was no valid contract between the parties and 
agrees that the standard of review for findings of fact is the clearly erroneous 
standard. However, A-1 Disposal does not agree that both parties testified 
that there was a contract and does not agree that that issue was not in 
contention and was not disputed by the parties. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(9): 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions 
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, 
including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial 
court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all 
record evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to 
recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request 
explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(c)(1): 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs; 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is 
entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
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demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or 
more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires 
it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or 
among themselves. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The case involves a claim by A-1 Disposal for money due for waste 
disposal services provided to Mel Ingersoll. Mr. Ingersoll counterclaimed, 
alleging that A-1 owed him money for a credit allegedly due him, pursuant to 
a hand written agreement. 
A-l claimed that any agreement that Mr. Ingersoll was due a credit was 
void because Mr. Ingersoll and Mark Powell, who was not named and who 
was to perform certain obligations not identified in the written document, 
had failed to perform the obligations that would have resulted in the credit 
being due. Mr. Ingersoll claimed that despite the fact that Mr. Powell was 
not made a party to the written document and the obligations to be 
performed by Powell were not identified, Mr. Ingersoll was still entitled to the 
credit. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below. 
A-l filed suit against Mr. Ingersoll, claiming money due for the services 
rendered. Mr. Ingersoll filed a counterclaim, claiming that there was a 
balance due to him because of the credit he claimed under a hand written 
document signed by Mr. Anderson in May 2002. The case was tried before 
the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck on April 27, 2005 without a jury and A-l 
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was awarded judgment in the amount of $8,307.00, plus interest on that 
amount from September 10, 2002. Recovery on Mr. Ingersoll's counterclaim 
was denied. 
Mr. IngersoU filed a Motion for New Trial or to Alter or Amend Judgment 
on May 14, 2005. That Motion was denied by Minute Entry dated February 
8, 2006. Mr. IngersoU now appeals from the denial of that Motion and the 
judgment of the Court. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
On May 15, 2002, Ralph Anderson, manager of Appellee A-l Disposal, 
met Appellant Mel IngersoU and a third party, Mark Powell, at a fast food 
restaurant in Salt Lake City, to discuss a business proposition that would 
involve A-l Disposal, Mr. IngersoU and Mr. Powell. A-l had previously 
provided trash disposal services to Mr. Powell and there was an outstanding 
debt due to A-1 from Mr. Powell. Mr. Anderson had never met Mr. IngersoU 
and A-l Disposal had never done business with Mr. IngersoU before the 
meeting. R. at 88, pp. 17-19. After some discussion, Mr. IngersoU wrote out 
a document on scratch paper that was signed by Mr. Anderson and Mr. 
IngersoU, but not by Mr. Powell. The document provided, 
Wherein A-1 acknowledges a credit owing Mel IngersoU in the amount of 
$14,500, to be paid in the following manner: A-l will furnish 30 yard 
(drop off) containers for IngersoU for a cost of $75.00 each with A-l 
paying landfill cost over that. Thereby if trucking & landfill total 
$10,000 for a month, IngersoU will pay $2500 and use the $7500 credit 
on the amount due. Billing will be at month end, with the payment 25% 
of total bill to be paid by 10th of month following. Service can continue 
after credit is used up if its agreeable with both parties. R. at 88, p.20; 
R. at 44. 
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There were also oral discussions between the parties at this meeting 
regarding the proposed transaction, as Mr. Powell was to deliver a truck and 
three containers to A-1 and Mr. Ingersoll was to deliver a truck to Mr. Powell, 
but there were apparently no terms agreed to as to when, where and how the 
performances of each party was to be completed. R. at 88, pp. 19-20. A-l 
immediately began providing service to Mr. Ingersoll, and continued the 
service through August 2002. R. at 88, pp. 21-22. Invoices for the services 
were sent by A-1 to Mr. Ingersoll weekly, but Mr. Ingersoll failed to pay for 
the services provided. R. at 88, p. 21 . A-l did receive a truck and two 
containers from Mr. Powell, but the truck was not in working condition and 
repair parts were not available, so the truck was never operable. The third 
container was never delivered to A-l by Mr. Powell. R. at 88, pp. 53-54. Mr. 
Powell advised A-1 that he had not received the truck or the title to the truck 
from Mr. Ingersoll. R. at 88, pp. 23, 46. Although there was evidence that 
Mr. Ingersoll did deliver a truck to Mr. Powell, the title to the truck showed 
that Mr. Ingersoll retained a lien on the truck, and accordingly, the title was 
returned by the Department of Motor Vehicles to Mr. Ingersoll. R. at 88, p. 
96. Prior to trial, Mr. Ingersoll took possession of the truck, ostensibly, 
because Mr. Powell owed Mr. Ingersoll on a debt. R. at 88, p. 124. 
A-1 and Mr. Ingersoll talked in July and August about the bill owing 
from Mr. Ingersoll and Mr. Ingersoll acknowledged that he owed some 
money, but he claimed that he could not understand A-1 's statements and 
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billing procedures and said he needed to reconcile the invoices. R. at 99, pp. 
22-24. In October 2002, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Ingersoll met to resolve the 
accounting and to discuss payment for the waste disposal services. R. at 88, 
p.24. At this meeting, they reached an agreement that the amount owed for 
the services was $8,307.00 and according to Mr. Anderson, Mr. Ingersoll 
agreed to pay that amount. R. at 88, p. 25. At trial, Mr. Ingersoll disputed 
that he made any such agreement and contended that A-1 still owed him the 
credit due for the truck he was to deliver to Mr. Powell. R. at 88, p. 99. 
In November 2002, Anderson, Ingersoll, Mark Powell and Daniel 
Kingston, an officer of A-l Disposal, met at Kingston's office to discuss 
payment of both Mr. Ingersoll's and Mr. Powell's past due accounts. At this 
meeting, Mr. Ingersoll said that he was dealing for both himself and Mr. 
Powell and that he wanted to resolve both accounts. R. at 88, pp. 27-28, 68-
71. Mr. Ingersoll acknowledged that he owed $8,307.00 for the services and 
that the credit of $6,193.00 could be credited to what Mr. Powell owed A-l. 
In December 2002, A-l applied the credit towards Mr. Powell's account, 
leaving a balance due from Mr. Ingersoll of $8,307.00. R. at 88, p. 28. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A-l contends that the judgment of the trial Court should be affirmed, 
because Mr. Ingersoll has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the 
Court's Findings of Fact. In addition, A-l contends that the court properly 
ruled that any agreement that Mr. Ingersoll was entitled to credit was not a 
valid contract and was unenforceable, for the reasons that it was ambiguous, 
did not contain the essential terms of any agreement between the parties and 
there was no meeting of the minds of the parties. A-1 further contends that 
the trial Court correctly ruled that A-1 was entitled to recover the value of 
the services rendered, which the parties agreed was $8,307.00, under a 
theory of unjust enrichment. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF A-1 SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
A-1 contends that the trial Court properly ruled in favor of A-1 on its 
Complaint and against Mr. Ingersoll on his Counterclaim and that the 
judgment should be affirmed. 
A. Mr. Ingersoll Has Failed To Marshal the Evidence 
Supporting the Court's Findings of Fact. 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires "[a] party 
challenging a fact finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that supports 
the challenged finding." See also, State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, 124 P.3d 235; 
Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, 54 P.3d 1177. To 
pass this threshold, the party protesting findings of fact must "marshal all 
the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in 
a light most favorable to the court below." Clark, 2005 UT 75. Where an 
appellant fails to so marshal the evidence, the appellate court will assume 
that all findings of fact are adequately supported by the record. Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 100 P. 3d 1177; 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 
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UT 72, 99 P. 3d 801. The appellate court then need not consider the 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, 
20 P. 3d 332. Mr. Ingersoll has totally failed to marshal any of the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings, but simply cites the evidence he 
contends supports his theory. 
There was ample evidence introduced at trial to support the court's 
findings of fact that there was no valid contract. For example, Mr. Anderson 
testified when asked whether or not he agreed that Mr. Ingersoll was entitled 
to the $14,500.00 credit, that "the original agreement was over." R. at 88, p. 
26. He also testified that "there wouldn't be any further services to use up 
the credit." R. at 88, p. 38. He testified that Mr. Ingersoll never claimed to 
be owed anything on the alleged credit. R. at 88, pp. 28, 49 and 132. Daniel 
Kingston also testified that Mr. Ingersoll never claimed to be entitled to any 
credit, R. at 88, p. 70. 
Further, it is clear from the written document itself, that essential terms 
for enforcement were missing. As the court found, 
The May 15, 2002, written document is not an integrated contract and 
indeed was not even a valid contract as it did not fully state several 
essential terms to form a valid agreement." R. at 47. 
The document did not mention Mr. Powell or what he was supposed to 
do, did not describe the consideration that was to be given, did not state 
when or where any performance was to be completed, or provide any 
remedies for non-performance. It was also clear from the evidence presented 
at trial, based upon the actions of the parties, that very shortly after the 
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document was executed, none of the parties considered the document to 
have any validity. 
B. A-1 Did Not Make Judicial Admissions of the Existence of a 
Contract That Entitled Mr. Ingersoll to $14,500.00 credit 
It is true that A-1 sued Mr. Ingersoll and that the Complaint alleged that 
Mr. Ingersoll owed A-1 $9,006.25 for goods and services rendered. R. at 1. 
That was the value of the services A-1 contended was owed for the services 
provided, pursuant to the agreement of the parties. It is clear from the 
Complaint, that A-1 did not agree that Mr. Ingersoll was due any credit 
under the May 15, 2002 document. In A-l's reply to Mr. Ingersoll's 
Counterclaim, R. at 8-9, A-1 specifically denied paragraph 3 of Mr. 
Ingersoll's Counterclaim that alleged, 
On or about May 15, 2002, counterclaim defendant Ralph Anderson 
(Anderson) entered into a contract with counterclaim plaintiff Mel 
Ingersoll (Ingersoll). R. at 6. 
A-1 also asserted the affirmative defenses to Mr. Ingersoll's counterclaim 
based upon the alleged contract, of failure or lack of consideration, prior 
breach by Mr. Ingersoll and the statute of frauds. These judicial pleadings, 
along with the testimony of A-l's witnesses cited above, certainly put Mr. 
Ingersoll and his counsel on notice that A-1 disputed the validity of any 
agreement to credit Mr. Ingersoll $14,500.00. Mr. Ingersoll argues that the 
proposed Findings of Fact filed by A-1 was a judicial admission, binding 
upon A-1. Mr. Ingersoll neglects to identify these Findings of Fact as 
"proposed", submitted to the court prior to trial, before any evidence was 
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offered and not accepted or adopted by the trial court. The proposed 
findings also stated in paragraph 8 "That the May 15, 2002 agreement 
became void" for non-performance. R. at 37. The evidence presented fully 
supported the trial court's findings that there was no enforceable contract. 
As Mr. Ingersoll failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings, it should be assumed that the findings are supported by the 
evidence. 
C. The Testimony and Conduct of A-1 Do Not Show the 
Existence of a Contract 
Contrary to what Mr. Ingersoll claims the evidence showed, (without 
marshaling the evidence supporting the findings as required) the evidence was 
clear that the parties, subsequent to May 15, 2002, did not rely upon or 
consider the May 15, 2002 document to be binding. Mr. Powell delivered an 
inoperable truck and two, rather than three, containers to Plaintiff. Mr. 
Ingersoll delivered a truck to Mr. Powell, however, he did not deliver the truck 
free and clear of liens. The title to the truck, listing Mr. Powell as owner, listed 
Mr. Ingersoll as a lien holder, showing that Mr. Ingersoll retained a security 
interest in the truck. Being listed as lien holder, when the transfer of title to 
Mr. Powell did take place, the new title would have been returned to Mr., 
Ingersoll, not Mr. Powell. That explains why Mr. Ingersoll, not Mr. Powell, had 
the title at trial and why Mr. Powell was apparently confused about when if 
ever, he received the title. R. at 88, p. 122. Clearly, no party followed through 
on any part of the May 15, 2002 document. The actions of the parties 
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demonstrated that no party considered the written document to be binding on 
any of them. Mr. Ingersoll did not pay what and when the May 15, 2002 
document said he would pay. Mr. Ingersoll acknowledged that he owed Plaintiff 
for service and never asked for the claimed credit until after this lawsuit was 
filed. The service of Plaintiff to Defendant was terminated after three or four 
months. Clearly, the evidence of an enforceable contract was not "undisputed" 
as Defendant claims, but instead, preponderated in favor of the Court's ruling. 
Mr. Ingersoll's reliance on the case of Osguthorpe v. Anschutz Land & 
Livestock Co., 456 F2d 996 (10th Cir. 1972) is misplaced. That case was not a 
bench trial as ours was, but was tried to a jury. The issue on appeal 
concerned the instructions that were given to the jury and the failure of the 
judge to give certain other instructions requested by the appellant. The Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in this case that the instructions given 
"precluded the defendant from advancing any tenable defense" and "the 
defendant was blocked out and frustrated in advancing a defense". In our 
case, there was no jury, no instructions and the judge carefully considered all 
of the offered evidence. 
D. The Trial Court's Finding Did Not Violate Mr. Ingersoll's Due 
Process of Law 
Mr. Ingersoll alleges that the trial court's finding that there was no 
contract between the parties deprived him of due process, because he did not 
have adequate notice that the existence of a contract was at issue and he was 
therefore deprived of the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way. This 
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argument is not supported by the record. Mr. Ingersoll's whole case was 
centered on proving the existence of a contract. His counterclaim pled for relief 
based upon the supposed contract. A-1 's Complaint and Reply to 
Counterclaim disputed the validity of any such contract. The document Mr. 
Ingersoll claimed to be a binding contract was received as evidence in the case, 
and Mr. Ingersoll called witnesses to support his theory that the document 
constituted a binding contract between the parties. In closing argument, he 
asked the trial court to award him judgment based upon the written document. 
Mr. Ingersoll cites the case of Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 
1983), as support for his due process argument. That case is readily 
distinguishable from our case. In Nelson, the defendant was pro se. He had 
discharged his attorney and apparently had not received from his attorney the 
file that contained the pleadings in the case. He appeared in court pursuant to 
the plaintiffs motion to set aside a stipulated dismissal of the case and to set 
the matter for trial. The defendant appeared at the hearing on the motion, 
without counsel and the motion was granted. The court informed the 
defendant that the matter would be set for a hearing (not a trial) two weeks 
later. Two days before the case was scheduled for trial, the defendant received 
the notice of trial from the court. Defendant appeared for trial without counsel 
and judgment was awarded to plaintiff on a cause of action for alienation of 
affections, in the total sum of $84,600.00, which included $25,000.00 punitive 
damages. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that giving the 
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defendant two days notice of the trial and not informing him of his rights as a 
pro se litigant, deprived him of due process. The court said at page 1214, 
The deficiency in this case concerns what happened before the trial. The 
vulnerability of a layman who is unrepresented as he approaches a trial of 
the legal and factual complexity of this case requires more judicial 
consideration than was extended here. Most importantly, defendant was 
not clearly informed of the date of trial until two days before it was to 
begin. That deficiency jeopardized one of the most important ingredients 
of due process: time to prepare a defense. 
In our case, the Complaint, Counterclaim, and the Reply to Counterclaim 
clearly presented the issues of whether or not there was a contract that entitled 
Mr. Ingersoll to any credit, whether that contract was void, and whether or not, 
if there were a contract, it was breached. A-l's Reply to Mr. Ingersoll's 
Counterclaim denied the existence of the contract. A-l's counsel, in his 
opening statement, speaking of the May 15, 2002 agreement, said, "So that 
agreement, at least in the eyes of the plaintiff, was void. It wasn't followed 
through; it was breached". R. at 88, p. The evidence and the testimony of the 
witnesses called by both parties, all spoke to those issues. Mr. Ingersoll was 
represented throughout the proceedings by competent counsel, who had 
conducted discovery, including deposing Mr. Anderson. There were no 
surprises and Mr. Ingersoll's due process rights were fully protected. 
E. Rule 54, U.R.C.P. Provides That a Judgment Shall Grant the 
Relief to Which the Party In Whose Favor It Is Rendered Is 
Entitled. 
Even if Mr. Ingersoll were correct, that the judgment of the trial court does 
not conform to the pleadings or to the relief requested by A-1, which clearly is 
not the case, Rule 54, U.R.C.P. provides, 
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(c) 1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered 
by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in 
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded 
such relief in his pleadings. 
Based upon all of the evidence presented at trial, the trial court properly 
concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to judgment in its favor, for the amount 
awarded and so ruled. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court heard the testimony of the witnesses, assessed their 
credibility, viewed the documentary evidence, and after taking the matter 
under advisement and weighing all of the evidence presented, found in favor of 
the plaintiff. For the foregoing reasons, A-l respectfully asks this court to 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Dated this j ^ / d a y of August, 2006. 
•1 I T T / i t ^ r r o f r k n S^~ Carl E. Kingston 
Attorney for A-1 Disposal 
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